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Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
FORECAST ACCURACY
In discussing the accuracy of economic fore-
casts, I’m going to rely heavily on the Blue Chip
compendium of forecasts. As many of you prob-
ably know, Blue Chip is a monthly newsletter
reporting forecasts from a panel of economic fore-
casters. The newsletter is dated the tenth of every
month, and I’ll be referring to the February 10,
2001 issue.
The Blue Chip Consensus forecast for the
U.S. economy is that in 2001 total real gross
domestic product (GDP) will grow by 2.1 percent
over its total for last year. It is important to note
that this forecast refers to the total GDP for the
year, and not the growth from the fourth quarter
of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2001, which is
another common way of measuring real growth
for the year. Blue Chip defines the “consensus”
as about the middle, or the median, of the 51
forecasters surveyed.
I think that forecast is reasonable, but suppose
I did not? Suppose, hypothetically, I were to tell
you that I believe the U.S. economy will be very
much weaker than the consensus forecast. Sup-
pose, also, that I were to tell you that, as a conse-
quence of weak GDP growth, corporate profits
are going to be much lower than the consensus
O
f all the things that people ask me
after speeches, at meetings, at par-
ties, and during casual conversation
over lunch, no topic arises more
often than that of my outlook for the economy.
Strangely enough, this is a topic on which I can
shed little light for anyone who is modestly well
informed. My purpose today is to discuss this
disconnect—why it is that people believe that I
have a very special economic forecasting crystal
ball and why I know that I do not.
The first question is pretty easy. People seem
to assume with little thought that I must have some
forecasting expertise, or otherwise I wouldn’t be
in my current position. I’ll challenge that assump-
tion by explaining why I know I do not have such
expertise. However, toward the end of my remarks
I’ll explain how I apply my professional expertise
to the output of expert economic forecasters.
I’ll explore my topic by first discussing the
accuracy of economic forecasts. Perhaps you are
already chuckling at that phrase—“the accuracy
of economic forecasts.” If so, I’m off to a good start.
Then I’ll dig into why forecasts are not very accu-
rate. I think that what I have to say in this regard
will ring true to you. If forecasts are not very accu-
rate, how can the Fed conduct monetary policy?
In discussing this question, I’ll emphasize that
what the Fed can do is to set a stable long-run path
for policy, yielding low and stable inflation on
the average. Finally, I will speak to the current
outlook, concentrating on conveying the nature
of the mainstream, consensus forecast. I share
that forecast because I am a consumer rather than
a producer of forecasts.forecast this year and next year as well. Moreover,
I’d tell you—this story is all hypothetical, remem-
ber, to prove a point—that with the miserable
outlook for corporate profits I believe that the
stockmarketisgrosslyovervaluedatcurrentlevels.
I’m sure I’d get your attention by spinning
out this dreary forecast. How would you react?
Would you, for example, pull out your cell phone
to tell your broker to sell all your common stock?
Would you use the cash you raised as collateral
for large additional short sales of common stock?
I think not. I hope not.
Why not? The answer is pretty simple. You
know that economists’ forecasts are not to be
taken that seriously. Whatever might be my fore-
cast, you know that there are other economists
with respectable credentials who are forecasting
continuing solid growth after a slow first half of
this year. Just as you would not sell short on the
basis of my forecast, you would not mortgage your
house to the hilt to buy stock on margin if I were
instead to offer a very upbeat forecast. My eco-
nomic forecast—every economic forecast—must
be treated with extreme caution.
In the February Blue Chip, 51 respondents
offered forecasts for 2001 and 47 for 2002.
Although the consensus forecast was 2.1 percent
real GDP growth in 2001 over 2000, the average
of the top 10 was 2.8 percent growth and the
average of the bottom 10 was 1.3 percent. The
most optimistic of the 51 forecasts for real GDP
growth in 2001 was 3.6 percent and the most pes-
simistic was 0.9 percent. For 2002, the consensus
forecast was 3.5 percent real growth; the average
of the top 10 was 4.1 and for the bottom 10 2.8
percent. The most optimistic real growth forecast
for 2002 was 5.3 percent and the most pessimistic
was 2.2 percent.
The range of forecasts is obviously quite sub-
stantial. The names in the Blue Chip list are mostly
names that you would recognize. They include
major banks and other companies that maintain
economic forecasting units. In addition, there
are specialized commercial forecasting firms in
the list. All of these forecasters have an intense
interest in getting the forecast right. They devote
substantial time and resources to their forecasts.
I am not in the forecasting business—I am a
consumer of economic forecasts. What should I
make of the substantial range of forecasts produced
by serious forecasters who make a living at this
enterprise? To me, the only reasonable conclusion
is that there is substantial room for significant
differences of professional opinion on this matter.
Different professionals have different views on
the outlook, and that fact must reflect gaps in econ-
omists’ knowledge. The fact is that economics is
not so well developed as a discipline that these
forecasters are all compelled by confirmed knowl-
edge to report forecasts clustering within a few
tenths of a percent of each other. Instead, what
economists can reasonably say they “know” per-
mits wide differences of opinion on forecasts.
Forecasters themselves will say that the differing
forecasts of many of their rivals are “reasonable.”
Let me now look at another dimension of this
range of forecasts. The February Blue Chip con-
tains a table of consensus forecasts for 2001 made
during the course of 2000. The January 2000 con-
sensus for 2001 was real growth of 3.0 percent.
The consensus forecast rose over the course of
2000, reaching a high of 3.5 percent in September.
In October the consensus was also 3.5 percent
real growth. In November, the consensus forecast
began to fall, but it slipped only slightly, to 3.4
percent. Thus, not only do various forecasters
differ about the outlook at any moment of time,
but they change their mind as time goes on. Just
to emphasize this point, note again that the con-
sensus for 2001 last November was 3.4 percent
but now, only three months later, the consensus
for this year has fallen to 2.1 percent real growth.
What should we conclude from the fact that
forecasts are often revised substantially over the
span of a few months, as illustrated by the recent
significant downward adjustment in the forecast
for this year? For one thing, certainly, one reason
why you ought not to sell your portfolio, or mort-
gage your house to buy additional stock, on the
basis of economic forecasts is that these forecasts
differ a lot from one forecaster to another and
change significantly with the passage of time,
even over a couple of months. For another thing,
let’s recognize that forecasts are not now and
never have been highly accurate.
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on the accuracy of economic forecasts. To discuss
this literature in any detail would require that I
get into a mind-numbing exposition of exactly
what is being forecast—for example, the prelimi-
nary or finally revised GDP estimate—and other
such matters. But let me give the flavor of this
research. Every forecast ought to have a standard
error attached to it. When discussing annual aver-
age data, which I have been doing so far today,
the standard error for a real GDP forecast is in
the neighborhood of 1 percentage point. That is,
when we say that the forecast for 2001 is 2.1 per-
cent real growth, what we mean is that there is
about a two-thirds probability that real growth
will be 2.1 percent plus or minus 1.0 percent.
That means, of course, that there is a one-third
probability that the actual outcome will be either
higher or lower than the range from 1.1 to 3.1
percent real growth.
We also need to attach an error band to the
inflation forecast. For 2001, the Blue Chip con-
sensus for the consumer price index is that its
annual average will be 2.6 percent above 2000,
with a range from high to low among the panel
of forecasters of 1.8 to 3.5 percent. Based on my
reading of the professional literature on this mat-
ter, I think that the reasonable standard error to
attach to the year-ahead inflation forecast is prob-
ably a bit smaller than for the year-ahead real GDP
forecast, but perhaps not all that much smaller.
Let me summarize this discussion briefly
before continuing. Economic forecasts are subject
to an inherent range of error. In the United States,
my assessment of the evidence is that every real
GDP forecast should have an error band around
it of about plus or minus 1 percentage point for a
forecast made at the beginning of the year. For
inflation, the error band should be only a little
smaller. Even with these large error bands, out-
comes outside the forecast range will be observed
fairly often. Failure to understand the limits of
economic forecasting can only produce problems
for anyone acting on the basis of the forecasts.
WHY FORECASTS GO ASTRAY
Where do forecast errors come from? Why do
forecasts go astray? Understanding the answers
to these questions helps us to better appreciate
what economic forecasts mean.
Let me begin with an analogy. Suppose you
were to ask a professor of chemistry at your local
university what will happen in the chemistry lab
next September 27 in the afternoon. The professor
might look a bit puzzled and then go on to explain
that, if the experiment concerns the effect of
pressure on the boiling point of water, then the
answer is very well-known. But, I insist, I want a
simple answer: What is going to happen? Don’t
confuse me, professor, with more questions.
My question to the chemistry professor, in
fact, is either foolish or meaningless. Chemistry
can provide good predictions when the experi-
ment is known. Without knowledge of what
experiment is to be run, it’s impossible to know
what the outcome is going to be.
Economic forecasters face the same problem.
The discipline of economics provides substantial
insights about what will happen if some specified
event takes place. But, not knowing what events
might take place—what economic experiments
might be run—we have a very weak basis for mak-
ing a forecast. In current circumstances, we are
being asked to offer a forecast even though we do
not know what the nature of possible tax legisla-
tion will be, what events might occur abroad,
what the resolution of the California electricity
situation will be, and so forth. Clearly, we face
thousands of possible events that could derail
even a very sensible forecast. So, one reason fore-
casts go astray is that things happen that the fore-
caster had not foreseen and in most cases could
not foresee.
Forecasts also go astray because economists
have not been able to pin down accurately how
the economy will respond to particular events.
Of course, the likely effects of some events are
better understood than others. That is, even after
some events occur, we are often uncertain about
their likely effects. In current circumstances, for
example, we do not have solid predictions of the
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after last March, or of the mild depreciation of the
dollar against the Euro in recent months, or of
the apparent downturn in the Japanese economy,
or of numerous other things that have happened
or seem likely to have happened. Knowledge just
isn’t all that complete. We can poke fun at econ-
omists or laugh at their plight. In fact, most of us
economists do both. Still, at the end of the day,
we have to take account somehow of the fact that
knowledge is incomplete. After all, we are talk-
ing about a deadly serious business because the
consequences of policy mistakes, as we all know,
can be very unfortunate.
Another reason forecasts go astray is that
behavior depends importantly on expectations
about the future. The decisions people make about
changing jobs, about saving and spending, and
that firms make about hiring workers and invest-
ing capital depend critically on their expectations
about the future, and in some cases the fairly
distant future. Economists understand something
about how expectations are formed, but there are
huge gaps in what we know. I suspect that for
the indefinite future economists will be faced
with uncertainties about sudden shifts of public
opinion, or non-shifts when changes in opinion
might seem logical.
I’ve discussed the sources of forecast errors
not because I believe that we have any realistic
chance of wiping them away but rather because
they are so obviously relevant when we spend a
few minutes thinking about them. Understanding
why forecasts go astray is an important part of
understanding what value forecasts have.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY
POLICY
What are the implications of limited forecast
accuracy for monetary policy? The place to start is
with the observation that professional forecasters
do in fact forecast more accurately than simple
alternatives one might consider. For example,
forecasters on average beat naive forecasts such
as that growth will be constant or the same as last
year. Forecasts are a valuable input to economic
policy, provided consumers of forecasts like me
understand their limitations.
Where I think my professional expertise
matters is in reading and assessing the work of
economic forecasters. I know why I think some
forecasts—almost always the ones at the
extremes—are “off the wall.” To understand why
forecasts have the characteristics they do requires
extensive knowledge of business cycle dynamics
and long-run economic growth processes. This
understanding is an important input to making
monetary policy decisions.
As you may know, twice each year each
member of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), the Fed’s main monetary policy body,
submits an economic forecast in preparation for
the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy Report to
the Congress and the Chairman’s congressional
testimony on that Report. Chairman Greenspan
submitted such a report and testified just two
days ago. Although the forecasts of individual
FOMCmembersarenotmadepublic,theMonetary
Policy Report has a table showing the range and
central tendency of those forecasts. At the St. Louis
Fed, we prepare our forecast by studying what
professional forecasters, both inside and outside
the Fed, are saying and examining whether we
might have some reason to differ from the consen-
sus forecast. By comparing the central tendency
of the FOMC forecasts with the Blue Chip
Consensus, for example, it is evident that the
FOMC forecasts are in the mainstream of profes-
sional forecasters in general. No one should be
surprised at this outcome; the professional fore-
casting fraternity bases its work on an accumulated
body of forecasting techniques broadly shared
among economists who specialize in this area.
Given what I’ve said so far, though, I hope
you agree that I’d be crazy to make my policy
position depend on whether a forecast is a few
tenths of a percent higher or lower. Nor should I
pay great attention to arguments among forecasters
about a few tenths of a percent real growth or
inflation. Given the record of forecast errors, a
forecast of real growth of 2 percent is basically
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cent. Quite frankly, it is ludicrous to present a
forecast to the tenth of percentage point when
the discussion is intended for a non-professional
audience. Doing so provides a completely mis-
leading picture of what a forecast might mean.
I’ve used tenths of percentage point today in dis-
cussing the Blue Chip forecasts because that is
how Blue Chip reports the forecasts. But when-
ever I discuss the outlook, I talk in terms of rough
ranges, or forecasts rounded off to the nearest half
percentage point. Thus, today I would not speak
of 2.1 percent real growth but of about 2 percent
real growth. And I would hope to get across the
pointthatwhatthatforecastreallymeansisgrowth
most likely in the 1 to 3 percent range. I am not
saying that it makes no difference whether growth
is 1 percent or 3 percent, but only that at this time
we must be prepared to deal with this range of
uncertainty.
Even if near-term forecasts were not subject
to considerable uncertainty, it is important to
recognize that monetary policy adjustments can-
not have precise and quick effects on the economy.
There has been lots of talk about whether the Fed
can engineer a “soft landing” for the economy. In
early December, I experienced a true soft landing;
after touring the Boeing F-18 assembly plant in
St. Louis, I had a short session on the F-18 simu-
lator. The instructor helped me to land an F-18 on
an aircraft carrier deck. That maneuver is routine
in the Navy, but I can assure you that the Federal
Reserve cannot land the economy on a carrier
deck in the economic ocean we face. Instead, the
Fed’s job is to keep the economy on a sound long-
run track; we cannot avoid most short-run eco-
nomic fluctuations, but we can help to prevent
those inevitable jolts from becoming cumulative
and pushing the economy far off its long-run
growth track.
Fed policy has been extremely successful in
recent years in maintaining confidence that the
rate of inflation will remain low and stable over
a period of years. This stable long-run outlook is
what enables the markets to work through neces-
sary short-run adjustments in constructive fash-
ion. Market interest rates respond sensitively to
current conditions and do much of the stabiliza-
tion work. The Fed sets a stable long-run envi-
ronment within which the markets can make
short-run adjustments in response to current
developments.
Let me now return to my opening paragraph
where I noted the intense interest people show
in my views about the economic outlook. People
do seem to expect that I will be able to shed some
light on where the economy may be going and
some light on future Federal Reserve policy. I hope
I have convinced you that I do not have any gems
of unconventional wisdom to offer on where the
economy is going. I accept the judgment of expert
forecasters, just as I do expert lawyers. I question
and probe to better understand expert advice, but
do not try to construct from scratch either my own
economic forecast or my own legal analysis.
Nor can I provide any help in forecasting the
Fed’s next policy adjustment. The issue here is
that economic conditions do sometimes change
rapidly, and the job of the FOMC is to collate all
the scraps of information up to the time of a
meeting. I do not even make final my own position
at an FOMC meeting until I quite literally get
there. Of course, I am accumulating information
all along, but I know from experience that new
information and new staff evaluation of existing
information can and should affect my thinking.
For example, I read carefully the Fed staff eco-
nomic forecast, which is available only a couple
of days before the FOMC meeting.
No one should have great confidence in what
action the FOMC will take four weeks, for exam-
ple, ahead of a meeting. The world is just too full
of surprises for that. As we come up to the day of
the meeting itself, the market and the Fed will
have digested all of the information available,
and in recent years have most often come to a
common judgment about the appropriate policy
action. This is as it should be given the uncer-
tainties of the world we face.
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OUTLOOK TODAY
As I already noted, the consensus outlook is
about 2 percent real growth and about 2 percent
CPI inflation in 2001, measured by the annual
average for 2001 over the annual average for 2000.
Lookingatquarterlydata,theBlueChipConsensus
for the first quarter is 1 percent real growth and
then about 2 percent for the second quarter.
Thereafter, Blue Chip sees the economy gradu-
ally picking up speed to a growth rate of about 3
percent in the fourth quarter. Growth is expected
to continue at about that rate into 2002.
This outlook should be regarded as very
heartening. Forecasters believe that the economy’s
slower first half will be followed by growth that
is more or less consistent with the economy’s
estimated long-term growth potential. The esti-
mate of growth potential reflects the underlying
demographics of the labor force, which point to
growth in labor input of about 1 percent per year
and estimated trend productivity growth in the
ballpark of 2.5 percent. The productivity growth
figure must be regarded with considerable uncer-
tainty, as productivity processes are not very
well understood. What I think we can say about
productivity growth is that every passing year
brings additional convincing evidence that U.S.
productivity growth is now measurably higher
than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. The issue is
how much higher and, more importantly, how
monetary policy should deal with the range of
uncertainty over productivity growth.
Most importantly, for me, is that through all
these current economic adjustments and uncer-
tainties the inflation rate remains well controlled.
In energy markets, futures prices indicate that
the best guess is that energy prices will be trend-
ing lower over the next several years. Current
information continues to suggest that firms believe
they have very little pricing power. Data on infla-
tion expectations over the longer run indicate
that households and firms continue to believe
that inflation will remain in the range of recent
years.
I’ll summarize by emphasizing three points.
First, the outlook I’ve outlined reflects the middle
of the range of best professional judgment. That
is the range where it is prudent for me as a policy-
maker to hang my hat. Second, the outlook is
subject to uncertainty and will most likely be
revised in coming months as new information
arrives. Third, because new information will in
all likelihood change the outlook in some respects,
monetary policy cannot be locked into a given
path for the principal policy instrument—the
target federal funds rate set by the FOMC. Every-
one should understand that the policy forecasts
for upcoming FOMC meetings currently built into
the market may well need to be revised, either
up or down. No policy actions are ever “baked
into the cake” long in advance of FOMC meetings.
I do not want to finish by leaving the impres-
sion that FOMC decisions are driven by short-run
data. The Fed has a commitment to low and stable
inflation as its most fundamental policy goal over
the long run. Short-run policy adjustments must
always be consistent with that fundamental goal.
This point is especially important in the current
environment, where understandable concerns
about the current state of the economy may tend
to obscure consideration of long-run policy objec-
tives. Our job is to filter out the short-run noise
in the data, about which we can do nothing any-
way, and maintain a stable policy environment
focused on keeping inflation low in the long run.
These are the conditions in which individuals,
firms, and markets can make necessary short-run
adjustments in an efficient manner.
I hope I’ve given you a perspective on how
economic forecasts fit into my conception of the
Fed’s policy process.
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